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NATURAL LAW COLLOQUIUM 
THE NATURAL LAW IN THE AMERICAN 
TRADITION† 
Hon. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain*
 
 
It is a privilege to be giving this lecture in the Fordham Natural Law 
Colloquium.  I embrace the Colloquium’s mission to encourage reflection 
on the natural law tradition, which I believe to be critical to a proper 
analysis of the most difficult issues of our day.  I am honored to be part of 
this discussion, and I want to thank the Colloquium and its supporters for 
making all of this possible. 
I 
On the last day of her testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
our newest Supreme Court Justice, Elena Kagan, was asked a question that 
seemed to surprise her:  “Do you believe it is a fundamental, pre-existing 
right to have an arm to defend yourself?,” asked Senator Tom Coburn of 
Oklahoma.1  When Kagan began to answer by stating that she “accept[ed]”2 
the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,3 which held 
that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep and bear 
arms, Coburn interrupted.  He was not asking whether she believed the right 
to be protected by the Constitution, but rather whether she considered it to 
be a “natural right.”4
 
†  Judge Diarmuid F. O’Sclannlain delivered this address at the Natural Law Colloquium, 
held on November 17, 2010 at Fordham University School of Law.  The remarks have been 
lightly edited and footnotes have been added. 
  “Senator Coburn,” replied Kagan, “to be honest with 
*  United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; A.B., 
St. John’s University, 1957; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1963; LL.M., University of Virginia, 
1992; LL.D. (Hon.), University of Notre Dame, 2002; LL.D. (Hon.), Lewis and Clark 
College, 2003.  The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily reflect the 
view of my colleagues or of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  I 
would like to acknowledge, with thanks, the assistance of Michael Murray and Kellen 
Dwyer, my law clerks, and Brian Stephan, a summer intern, in helping to prepare these 
remarks. 
 1. Senate Committee on the Judiciary Holds a Hearing on the Elena Kagan 
Nomination, WASH. POST, June 30, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/documents/KAGANHEARINGSDAY3.pdf. 
 2. Id. 
 3. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 4. Senate Committee on the Judiciary Holds a Hearing on the Elena Kagan 
Nomination, supra note 1. 
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you, I don’t have a view of what are natural rights independent of the 
Constitution.”5
This answer concerns me.  How could someone who spent her entire 
career studying the Constitution and the Supreme Court, not have a view 
about natural law, or natural rights?  The implication of Justice Kagan’s 
answer is that she does not think one needs to reflect on the natural law in 
order to be a good judge or a good constitutional lawyer.  Now, I certainly 
do not mean to pick on Justice Kagan.  In fact, her agnosticism about 
natural rights reflects the mainstream of contemporary legal thinking.  Too 
many of us have succumbed to the view that our rights arise “merely from 
the law that [is] ‘posited’ or written down.”
 
6  Too few of us take seriously 
the notion of natural rights, that is, of objective rights held by all humans as 
a matter of moral principle.  This is why, when people today refer to the 
freedoms of speech and of religion, they will speak of “the rights we have 
through the First Amendment,” as if their existence depended on the 
positive law.  Or, we speak of our right to keep and bear arms under the 
Second Amendment, as if the right was created by the Constitution.7
This view stems from a variety of sources.  Some are skeptical of the 
existence of natural law.  In the academy, it is oft-heard that those who 
believe in the natural law are “metaphysical,” as opposed, I presume, to 
empirical.  And, of course, throughout the last century there was a 
movement to materialize philosophy, to respect the work of theoretical 
physicists or molecular biologists while distrusting the first principles 
philosophy of traditional metaphysics.  There is also, I sense, a widespread 
view that the natural law is parochial, specifically, Catholic. 
 
This skepticism of the metaphysical is backed by an historical argument 
which contends that the American legal tradition does not include a natural 
law element.  The counternarrative I have heard, which focuses on 
Benjamin Franklin, is that America is founded on something like Dewey’s 
“pragmatism.”8  America, in this view, is a nation solely of the practical.  
John Hart Ely, in his rightly-praised classic Democracy and Distrust, states 
that the belief that the Constitution embodies natural law principles “was 
not even the majority view among those ‘framers’ we would be likely to 
think of first.”9  Ely contends that “natural law and natural rights 
philosophies were not that broadly accepted; in fact, they were quite 
controversial.”10
Others believe that natural law, regardless of its existence or its historical 
pedigree, is dangerous.  Their concern is that natural law might empower 
judges to base decisions on their own sense of justice, rather than relying on 
 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. HADLEY ARKES, CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS AND ANCHORING TRUTHS:  THE 
TOUCHSTONE OF THE NATURAL LAW 7 (2010). 
 7. Id. 
 8. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE (2000). 
 9. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 39 
(1980). 
 10. John Hart Ely, Foreword:  On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 
5, 25 (1978). 
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traditional legal sources such as text and precedent.11
I, like many, trace this hostility to Lochner v. New York,
  This last thread of 
criticism is hostile to natural law, not merely apathetic.  It asserts natural 
law concerns are antithetical to responsible judging. 
12 in which the 
Supreme Court invalidated an employment law on the grounds that it 
violated a substantive due process right to “liberty of contract.”  In dissent, 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes rightly accused the Court of importing a 
laissez faire economic philosophy into the Constitution.13
In Griswold, of course, the Court held that a “right to privacy” in the 
Constitution forbade states from criminalizing the use of contraceptives by 
married couples.  In dissent, Justice Black accused the majority of 
“Lochnerizing,” that is, of importing a “natural law due process 
philosophy” into the Constitution.
  Lochner, and 
similar cases of that age, were seen as instances of “natural law reasoning.”  
Thus, criticism of “the Lochner era” became bound up with criticism of the 
natural law.  And, by the time Griswold v. Connecticut was decided, all 
nine of the Justices had decried the use of the natural law in judging. 
14  Justice Black’s dissent insisted that the 
Court cannot rely on “any mysterious and uncertain natural law concept as a 
reason for striking down [the Connecticut] law.”15
So, we find the natural law under attack from both sides.  To the left, it is 
an invention of mystics and religious conservatives.  To the right, it is a 
dangerous invitation for judges to impose their own sense of justice on the 
country. 
  The majority, for its 
part, decried the use of natural law as well, in an effort to distance itself 
from Lochner.  Accordingly, those who believe in judicial restraint are 
skeptical of natural law because, to them, it conjures up the judicial 
adventurism of the Lochner era and the Warren Court. 
Tonight, I offer a different view.  I believe that, in many important 
respects, the natural law is woven into the fabric of the Constitution, and, 
therefore, is relevant to originalist constitutional interpretation.  Thus, every 
lawyer, and certainly every judge, should study and understand the natural 
law—not because it is enforceable in its own right—but because it informs 
our understanding of the Constitution’s original meaning. 
In offering these thoughts, I am mindful that I speak as a federal judge, 
not a professional philosopher.  My main purpose tonight is not to lay out a 
path-breaking philosophical theory.  Rather, it is to assure you that the 
natural law plays an important role in what I do as a judge, and should play 
an important role in what you do as lawyers. 
 
 11. Id. at 26–29. 
 12. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 13. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“This case is decided upon an economic theory 
which a large part of the country does not entertain.  If it were a question whether I agreed 
with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before making up my mind.  But 
I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or 
disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law.  
The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”). 
 14. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 516–17 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 15. Id. at 522. 
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II 
First, let’s discuss history.  Professor Hadley Arkes, in his latest book, 
Constitutional Illusions and Anchoring Truths, has provided an excellent 
guide to the understanding of natural rights shared by our Founding Fathers.  
Professor Arkes shows how the founding generation was deeply attuned to 
the moral grounding of our rights.  The Founders possessed, in his words, a 
“remarkable capacity . . . to trace [their] judgments back to first 
principles.”16  And, indeed, their writings are replete with references to a 
higher, unwritten law, accessible to human reason.  The Federalist Papers, 
for instance, frequently rely on “nature” and “reason” to justify general 
principles of law.17
But I want to focus on the Declaration of Independence for a moment.  
The Declaration explicitly appeals to the natural law.  It insisted “the Laws 
of Nature and of Nature’s God” entitled this country to dissolve its political 
bonds with England, and declared that “[w]e hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness.”
 
18  According to this seminal document, the 
purpose of government is to protect these natural rights.  In the 
Declaration’s words:  “to secure these rights, Governments are instituted 
among Men.”19
I think this last line is critical because it defines the relationship between 
natural rights and civil governments.  The Declaration is not saying, “we 
are starting this new government and we are going to give our citizens all 
sorts of new rights.” It is saying that human beings have innate rights that 
everyone has a moral obligation to respect, whether or not there is a 
government to define and protect those rights.  And the only reason to 
create governments, in the first place, is to protect those rights which 
humans have independent of government. 
 
The doctrines of “unalienable rights” and universal equality in the 
Declaration were derived from the works of John Locke, one of the 
foremost natural law theorists of the day.20  Indeed, that natural rights 
include life, liberty and pursuit of happiness is but a tweak away from the 
Lockean proposition that men have rights to life, liberty, and property.21  
And the phrase “all men are created equal” all but plagiarizes Locke’s 
phrase, “all Men by Nature are equal.”22
 
 16. ARKES, supra note 6, at 8. 
 
 17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 526 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 545(Alexander Hamilton); see also ARKES, supra note 6, at 25. 
 18. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2. 
 19. Id. (emphasis added). 
 20. Mark C. Niles, Ninth Amendment Adjudication:  An Alternative to Substantive Due 
Process Analysis of Personal Autonomy Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 85, 108–16 (2000). 
 21. Id. 
 22. JOHN LOCKE, LOCKE’S SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 322 (Lester DeKoster, 
ed., 1978). 
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And it is not just the rhetoric of the Declaration of Independence that 
invokes the natural law.  The Declaration is above all an act.  It does what 
it says.  The act it performs is one of separation.  It proclaims that, 
“whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends,” 
that is, the end of protecting unalienable rights, “it is the Right of the People 
to alter or to abolish” the government.  And so it does.  This theory of 
government, put into action by the Declaration, is the practical application 
of Locke’s natural law idea that the government exists to further natural law 
and to protect natural rights, and, therefore, when a government fails to do 
so, it is owed no allegiance.23
That the Declaration embodies natural law principles is no surprise given 
that its author, Thomas Jefferson, was heavily influenced by Locke.  He 
constantly recommended Locke to his friends, provided Locke a prominent 
place in the curriculum of the University of Virginia, and even remarked 
that “Locke’s little book on government is perfect as far as it goes.”
 
24  And 
at least three of the other members of the “Committee of Five” appointed to 
write the Declaration, are on record as believers in natural law, albeit 
different versions.25
When it came to writing a Constitution, the Framers aimed to create a 
positive law that would protect pre-existing natural rights.  This should not 
surprise us.  After all, the Declaration of Independence asserted that the 
very purpose of civilian governments was to protect natural rights.  
Although the Constitution, unlike the Declaration, does not explicitly 
reference natural law, it does use terms which cannot be understood apart 
from the natural law tradition from which they were plucked.  Indeed, when 
our founders codified fundamental rights in the Constitution, they did not 
believe that they were “creating” those rights, any more than a 
mathematician “creates” mathematical principles when he writes the axioms 
of a formal system. 
 
For example, Philip Hamburger has marshaled extensive evidence that 
the natural law was understood as the source of the rights codified in the 
First Amendment.26  The Founders regarded the freedoms of speech and of 
the press as natural rights—rights individuals had even in the absence of 
government.27
 
 23. Id. at 77–79. 
  Writing in 1789, for instance, Roger Sherman declared “the 
rights . . . of Speaking, writing and publishing their Sentiments with 
decency and freedom” as among the “natural rights which are retained by 
[the people] when they enter into society.”  And individuals ranging from 
 24. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph (May 30, 1790), in 5 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 171, 173 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons 1895); see also Niles, supra note 20, at 109 n.73. 
 25. Terry Brennan, Natural Rights and the Constitution:  The Original Intent, 15 HARV. 
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 965, 971 nn.23 & 33 (1992). 
 26. Philip Hamburger, Natural Law, Natural Rights, and American Constitutions, 102 
YALE L.J. 907 (1993). 
 27. Id. at 919. 
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James Madison to the anti-federalist, “Brutus,” spoke of the natural right to 
freedom of conscience, which became the freedom to exercise religion.28
The freedom of the press also derived from the natural right to speak, to 
write, and to publish one’s thoughts.  Patrick Henry proclaimed that 
freedom of the press was among the “rights of human nature.”
 
29  Roger 
Sherman insisted that “[s]peaking, writing and publishing [one’s] 
[s]entiments” is a natural right.30  And the freedom of assembly was 
derived from the natural right to associate with other human beings.31
Professor Arkes likes to illustrate the founders’ view of this relationship 
between natural rights and the positive rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution, by discussing their debate during the constitutional 
convention, about whether to include a ban on ex post facto laws.
 
32  “For 
the Founders,” Arkes explains, “the principle on ‘ex post facto’ laws was 
one of those deep principles of lawfulness that had a claim to be respected 
in all places, or incorporated in the basic law of any country that would 
claim to be a civilized country under the rule of law.”33
The principle was so obvious, and so widely known, that some Framers 
thought it was unnecessary, and almost embarrassing, to declare it in the 
Constitution as though it were news.
 
34  James Wilson, for one, feared that 
placing an ex post facto ban in the Constitution would “proclaim that we are 
ignorant of the first principles of Legislation, or are constituting a 
Government which will be so.”35
The natural law played a similar role in the Civil War era debate which 
would eventually spawn the Reconstruction Amendments.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment, of course, echoes the Declaration’s promise of equality.
  Thus, we see that the Ex Post Facto 
Clause merely codified a principle which eighteenth century lawyers grew 
up believing was a fundamental command of the natural law. 
36
This congruence between the natural law and the principles that came to 
be embodied in the Reconstruction Amendments was not lost on the 
greatest lawyer of the day, Abraham Lincoln.  In his debates with Senator 
Stephen Douglas, Lincoln articulated a natural law argument against 
slavery.  In Lincoln’s view, the Declaration of Independence established 
“an abstract truth, applicable to all men and all times,” that “all men are 
created equal.”
  It 
enshrines equality in our law, fulfilling the natural law promise made nearly 
one hundred years earlier. 
37
 
 28. Id. at 919 n.38. 
  The Declaration “meant simply to declare the right, so 
 29. Id. at 919 n.39. 
 30. Id. at 948. 
 31. Id. at 919 n.40. 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, 10; see Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003). 
 33. ARKES, supra note 6, at 28. 
 34. Id. at 9. 
 35. Id. at 27 (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 376 
(Max Farrand, ed., Yale Univ. Press 1937) (1966)). 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 37. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Henry L. Pierce (Apr. 6, 1859), available at 
http://showcase.netins.net/web/creative/lincoln/speeches/pierce.htm. 
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that the enforcement of it might follow,”38  Slavery, Lincoln insisted, 
violated a fundamental notion of equality, one promised by the Declaration 
of Independence.  Lincoln quoted Proverbs 25:11:  “A word fitly spoken is 
like an apple of gold in a frame of silver.”  Lincoln likened the Constitution 
to the frame, and the Declaration to the apple, noting, “the frame is made 
for the apple, not the apple for the frame.”39  Thus, to Lincoln, the 
Constitution should be designed to capture the natural law’s sense of 
justice.  And, of course, with respect to equality, it soon was, in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  Accordingly, Justice 
Thomas and others have argued, correctly in my view, that the Equal 
Protection Clause codified a natural law version of equality.40
III 
 
Now we reach the most difficult question of any lecture, or any academic 
paper, and that’s:  so what?  What does this history have to do with your 
jobs as lawyers and academics, and with my job as a judge? 
The one version of natural law theory, espoused by Professor Arkes and 
others, holds that judges should interpret and enforce the natural law 
themselves.  Arkes believes that, if judges are “to apply the Constitution 
sensibly,” they must “appeal beyond the text of the Constitution” to “those 
deeper principles that informed and guided the judgment of the Founders as 
they went about the task of framing the Constitution.”41  In Arkes’s view, 
the line separating law and morals is a thin one, and judges should openly 
engage in moral reasoning when deciding cases.  Arkes proposes that 
judges give effect to “the first principles of . . . moral judgment” in 
interpreting the Constitution.42
But this is not the only theory of how natural law is relevant to judging, 
nor is it necessarily the majority view.  In fact, I do not know of a single 
American judge who is on record as supporting the direct judicial 
enforcement of the natural law.  Even the jurists who are well-known for 
believing in the natural law, Justice Clarence Thomas and Judges Robert 
Bork and William Pryor, for instance, do not believe that judges have the 
authority to enforce it.
 
43
 
 38. Id. 
  And there is nothing contradictory about believing 
 39. Douglas W. Kmiec, The Human Nature of Freedom and Identity:  We Hold More 
Than Random Thoughts, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 33, 49 (2005). 
 40. Clarence Thomas, Toward a Plain Reading of the Constitution:  The Declaration of 
Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOW. L.J. 691 (1987). 
 41. ARKES, supra note 6, at 6–7; see also HADLEY ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION 
(1990). 
 42. ARKES, supra note 6, at 12. 
 43. Judge Pryor has indicated that, if he ever felt that human law conflicted with natural 
law to such an extent that he could not in good conscience enforce the human law, the proper 
remedy would be to resign, not to disregard the human law.  See William H. Pryor, Jr., 
Christian Duty and the Rule of Law, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 8 (2003) (“As a public official, if I 
am ever unable to fulfill my oath and obey the command of a federal court directed against 
me, in my official capacity, then I should resign.”).  Before becoming a judge, Justice 
Thomas gave a speech that his critics interpreted as supporting the judicial enforcement of 
the natural law.  See Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or 
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in natural law, on the one hand, but rejecting judicial authority to enforce it, 
on the other. 
Indeed, ten years ago at this very colloquium, Robert George eloquently 
defended the view that “questions of the existence and content of natural 
law and natural rights are, as a logical matter, independent of questions of 
institutional authority to give practical effect to natural law and to protect 
natural rights.”44  That is, the natural law itself does not settle the question 
of which actors, in any given governmental system, have the authority to 
say what the natural law requires.  As Professor George put it, “Natural law 
does not dictate an answer to the question of its own enforcement.”45  
Rather, whether it is better to give the power to determine which positive 
laws are consistent with the natural law to legislatures, or whether it is 
better to give that power to courts, is a question that is “underdetermined by 
reason.”46  Thus the natural law allows government designers to choose 
either of these “morally acceptable options.”47  This means that “[a]ny 
argument seeking to establish the authority of courts to invalidate 
legislation by appeal to natural law and natural rights ungrounded in the 
constitutional text or history, . . . will itself have to appeal to the 
constitutional text and history.”48
And I have not seen a persuasive textual or historical argument that the 
Framers intended to vest federal judges with the power to strike down 
statutes that conflict with the judge’s own conception of what the natural 
law requires.  Indeed, I believe that constitutional text and history compel 
the opposite conclusion. 
 
Textually, Article III of the Constitution endows the federal courts with 
“the judicial power.”  Just as the President can only exercise “executive 
power,”49 and the Congress only “legislative power,”50
 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63 (1989).  
But Justice Thomas renounced such a position at his confirmation hearings.  See Randy E. 
Barnett, Getting Normative:  The Role of Natural Rights in Constitutional Adjudication, 12 
CONST. COMMENT. 93, 95 (1995).  And, a close reading of the speech suggests that Justice 
Thomas supports the more moderate view that, where a constitutional provision codifies a 
natural law principle, the natural law can inform our understanding of that right.  See 
Thomas, supra, at 66 (“The higher law background of the Constitution reminds us that our 
political arrangements are not mere mechanical contrivances, but rather have a purpose.”); 
id. at 68 (arguing that Brown v. Board of Education would have “had the strength of the 
American political tradition behind it if it had relied on the natural law purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, instead of relying on dubious social science”). 
 we judges have no 
constitutional authority to exercise anything except “judicial power.”  While 
the Constitution does not define “judicial power,” it was a concept well-
known to eighteenth century lawyers.  As Philip Hamburger explains in his 
recent book, Law and Judicial Duty, the “judicial Power” was originally 
 44. Robert P. George, Natural Law, the Constitution, and the Theory and Practice of 
Judicial Review, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2269, 2279–80 (2001) (emphasis added). 
 45. Id. at 2279. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 2280–81. 
 49. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 50. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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understood to mean essentially what it had meant in England:  the power of 
courts to decide cases in accord with the law of the land.51
Historically, Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 78, defended the idea 
of an unaccountable and independent judiciary by promising the People that 
“nothing would be consulted [in the courts] but the constitution and the 
laws.”
 
52  Thus, because judges would be, “bound down by strict rules and 
precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every 
particular case that comes before them,” there would be no “arbitrary 
discretion in the courts.”53  As Hamilton famously put it, the judiciary was 
to exercise “neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment.”54
Now, one might respond that Marbury v. Madison told us that “[i]t is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is,” and perhaps this should include the power to say what the 
natural law is.  But recall that before Chief Justice Marshall uttered that 
famous line, he first went to great lengths to establish that the Constitution 
is law, not an aspirational moral code, and, accordingly, that judicial review 
is no different from any other choice of law question.
  This 
conception of a neutral judicial power precludes judges from dictating what 
the natural law requires. 
55  Put another way, 
deciding whether one law, a constitutional provision, conflicts with another 
law, a statute, is the kind of thing that judges do.56
As my friend Robert Bork put it, “I am far from denying that there is a 
natural law, but I do deny . . . judges have any greater access to that law 
than do the rest of us.”
  But, by contrast, there is 
no reason to believe that it is “emphatically the province” of courts to 
discern moral truths from first principles. 
57
To make the point more formally, natural law is by its nature a moral law 
accessible to all human beings through reason.  It is not something uniquely 
  Judge Bork had a point:  lawyers are very good at 
interpreting written texts, but there is no reason to believe that they are any 
more moral than anyone else.  In fact, in poll after poll, the public rates us 
lawyers behind almost every other profession when it comes to morality, 
just above used-car salesmen.  One might respond that those politicians in 
the legislature are not exactly known for their morality either, but at least 
politicians can be thrown out of office if they write laws in violation of the 
public’s sense of what the natural law requires. 
 
 51. PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 17 (2008). 
 52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
(emphases added). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 523. 
 55. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“Certainly all those who 
have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and 
paramount law of the nation.”). 
 56. See id. (“Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound 
and interpret that rule.  If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the 
operation of each.”). 
 57. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 66 (1990). 
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assessable to lawyers, like civil procedure or secured transactions.  I 
therefore do not believe that judges have an inherent right to interpret the 
natural law in a way that is binding on the rest of the country.  In saying 
this, I do not mean to imply that the natural law is subjective, only that 
judges are not its authoritative interpreters. 
Along these lines, I have been told the story of a lawyer who made a 
natural law argument in court.  The judge interrupted him and said, “I’m 
sorry, counselor, but I will not entertain natural law arguments in my 
courtroom.”  The attorney became indignant, asking the judge “why, don’t 
you believe in the natural law?”  The judge responded, “yes, I certainly do, 
but the problem is that I lack jurisdiction.”  That’s how I feel about the 
matter:  I do not believe that judges have the freestanding authority to 
enforce the natural law. 
But before moving on, I want to speak about one more philosopher who 
dealt with the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate efforts to 
enforce the natural law.  And I dare say he was at least as good a 
philosopher as Professor George.  His name was Socrates.  In two of the 
most famous works involving Socrates, The Apology and Crito, one finds 
an apparent contradiction. The Apology tells the story of the trial of 
Socrates, at which he argues, by appeal to something like the natural law, 
that the Athenians are acting unjustly by putting him to death.  Crito tells 
the story of a friend who comes to rescue Socrates before his execution, 
only to find that the stubborn Socrates refuses to leave prison, arguing that 
he would be acting unjustly if he did not let the Athenians execute him. 
What gives?  Did the greatest logician ever to walk the earth contradict 
himself with his dying breath?  Of course not.  In Crito, Socrates explained 
that, even though his execution violated the natural law, it would be unjust 
for him to take the law into his own hands by evading an execution which 
Athens, through a lawful process, determined that he deserved.  Socrates 
believed that, by living in Athens, he agreed to be bound by Athenian law, 
which he knew would never perfectly capture the natural law.  In one 
particularly dramatic scene, Socrates imagines that he is speaking with the 
laws of Athens.  The laws ask Socrates whether the agreement (between 
Socrates and the laws) was that the laws would never wrong him, or “was it 
that you would respect the judgments that the city came to?”  If he were to 
break out of prison, Socrates concluded, he would be “destroying the law 
which says that the decisions of the city must be carried out.” Socrates 
leaves us with the edict that  “One must obey the commands of one’s city 
and country, or persuade it as to the nature of justice.” 
Like Socrates, I believe that were I, as a judge, to enforce my own 
version of the natural law, I would “destroy that law which says the 
decisions of this nation must be respected.”  Indeed, I would break my oath 
of office, in which I explicitly agreed to be bound by the Constitution and 
laws of the United States.  As Robert George put it, “respect for the rule of 
law is itself a requirement of natural justice.”58
 
 58. George, supra note 44, at 2282. 
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Along these lines, let me add that Socrates was not just saying that the 
natural law does not require that he circumvent the procedures of the 
positive law to achieve justice, he was saying that the natural law 
affirmatively mandates that he not do so.  Indeed, Socrates was saying that 
he must stay and suffer an unjust death rather than take the law into his own 
hands.  Now, thankfully, my own refusal to take the law into my own hands 
has never caused me to suffer unjust death, save only, perhaps, unjust 
criticism from some of my Ninth Circuit colleagues. 
So I do not believe that I, as a judge, have the authority to strike down a 
statute, simply because I think it violates the natural law. 
IV 
But, if judges cannot strike down statutes as violative of natural law, how 
is natural law relevant to judging?  I believe it is relevant in two major 
ways:  one rather technical, and the other more abstract. 
A 
On the more technical side, the natural law is useful when interpreting 
provisions of the Constitution that were themselves efforts to codify pre-
existing natural law rights.  There, the judicial inquiry is an historical one, 
not a philosophical one.  The question is how the relevant principle was 
understood at the time the provision was enacted—not how the principle 
ought to be understood as a matter of abstract moral philosophy.59
Consider, in this respect, the recent controversy over the meaning of the 
Second Amendment.  In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court 
held that a blanket prohibition on the possession of usable handguns in the 
home violates the Second Amendment.
 
60  In the process, the Court declared 
that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep and to 
bear arms for the purpose of self-defense.61
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Heller begins with a straightforward 
examination of the text and the relevant historical evidence that would 
reveal how each phrase of the text would have been understood by your 
average, eighteenth century reader.  Justice Scalia then concludes that 
“Putting all of these textual elements together, we find that they guarantee 
the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of 
confrontation.”
  Heller has been extensively 
analyzed by those interested in the gun-control debate.  But I would like to 
suggest that Heller is at least as notable for its method of constitutional 
interpretation, as it is for its actual holding. 
62
 
 59. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, THE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES:  LAW, RELIGION, AND 
MORALITY IN CRISIS 181–82, 196 (2001). 
 
 60. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2787–88 (2008). 
 61. Id. at 2821 (“[W]hatever else it leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above 
all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of 
hearth and home.”). 
 62. Id. at 2797. 
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One might have expected this to be the end of the matter.  But instead, 
the Court launched an extended discussion of the natural right to bear arms, 
as it was understood during the one hundred years leading up to the 
enactment of the Constitution.  “We look to this,” the Court explained, 
“because it has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment 
. . . codified a pre existing right.”  Indeed, the Court continued, “[t]he very 
text of the Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the preexistence of the 
right and declares only that it ‘shall not be infringed.’”63  The Heller Court 
explained that, because the right to keep and bear arms was considered a 
natural right, the debate “was not over whether it was desirable (all agreed 
that it was) but over whether it needed to be codified in the Constitution.”64
The Court found that the natural right to bear arms, as understood in the 
eighteenth century, was what Blackstone called “the natural right of 
resistance and self preservation,’ and ‘the right of having and using arms for 
self preservation and defence.’”
 
65
First, it confirmed the Court’s earlier conclusion, based on the original 
meaning of the text, that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual 
right to bear arms for self-defense, as opposed merely to protecting a 
collective right to bear arms for militia service.
  Heller found this understanding of the 
natural right to bear arms relevant in four ways. 
66
Second, the Court relied on the natural right to bear arms in order to find 
that the Second Amendment’s primary rationale was self-defense, not 
militia service.  Indeed, Heller’s ultimate conclusion was that, “[w]hatever 
else [the Second Amendment] leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates 
above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use 
arms in defense of hearth and home.”
  Because the natural right 
to bear arms was an individual right unconnected to militia service, the 
Court reasoned, the Second Amendment right, which aimed to codify the 
natural right, must also be an individual right unconnected to militia 
service. 
67  This statement stands in stark 
contrast with the Heller Court’s willingness to admit that the Second 
Amendment probably does not protect any arms that would be useful in 
modern warfare.68
 
 63. Id. 
  Accordingly, Heller defined the core Second 
 64. Id. at 2801. 
 65. Id. at 2798 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *136, *140). 
 66. Id. at 2797 (“Putting all of these textual elements together, we find that they 
guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.  This 
meaning is strongly confirmed by the historical background of the Second Amendment.”); 
see also id. at 2798 (noting that the natural right to bear arms “was clearly an individual 
right, having nothing whatever to do with service in a militia”). 
 67. Id. at 2821 (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. at 2817 (“It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military 
service—M-16 rifles and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is 
completely detached from the prefatory clause.  But as we have said, the conception of the 
militia at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification was the body of all citizens 
capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed 
at home to militia duty.  It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias 
in the 18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at 
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Amendment right more by reference to Blackstone’s conception of “the 
natural right of . . . self preservation and defence,” than by reference to the 
text of the amendment, which refers to “well-regulated militia[s].”  Since 
the rationale for a right often determines its scope, Heller’s conception of 
the Second Amendment right as being primarily about self-defense, could 
play an important role as lower courts struggle to determine which gun 
control regulations are permissible under the Second Amendment.   
Third, and relatedly, Heller used the framer’s belief in a natural right to 
bear arms to explain the relevance of the Second Amendment’s prefatory 
clause.  Recall that the Second Amendment states that:  “A well regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”69
The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the 
only reason Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought 
it even more important for self defense and hunting.  But the threat that the 
new Federal Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by taking away 
their arms was the reason that right . . . was codified in a written 
Constitution.
  Just to be clear, 
when I speak of the “prefatory clause,” I’m referring to that first clause, 
about militias.  The Heller Court found that: 
70
Thus, to the Heller Court, although the need to protect militias was the 
reason that the natural right to bear arms had to be codified, it was not the 
primary purpose of the underlying natural law right; self-defense was.  As 
the Court put it, although “self defense had little to do with the right’s 
codification; it was the central component of the right itself.”
 
71
Finally, the Heller Court noted that the fact that the Second Amendment 
codified a natural law right reduced the significance of other clues to 
meaning and intent, such a drafting history.  The Court deemed it “dubious 
to rely on such history to interpret a text that was widely understood to 
codify a pre-existing right, rather than to fashion a new one.”
 
72
Accordingly, Heller tells us that natural law can factor into constitutional 
interpretation in subtle, but significant ways.  It tells us that, where a 
constitutional provision codified a pre-existing, natural right, the historical 
understanding of that natural right can clarify ambiguities in the 
constitutional text and elucidate the rationale and scope of the constitutional 
right. 
 
It remains to be seen how Heller-style attention to natural rights might 
affect other areas of constitutional jurisprudence.  Recall that Heller twice 
referred to other constitutional rights that were also mere codifications of 
 
large.  Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against 
modern-day bombers and tanks.  But the fact that modern developments have limited the 
degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our 
interpretation of the right.”). 
 69. U.S. CONST. amend II. 
 70. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 2804. 
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pre-existing natural rights.  Heller asserted that “it has always been widely 
understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth 
Amendments, codified a pre existing right.”73
B 
  Recall also that the Ex Post 
Facto and Equal Protection Clauses have natural law roots.  I think that 
further research is necessary to determine how an understanding of the 
natural law predecessors to each of these codified rights should affect our 
interpretation of the codified rights.  Indeed, for all you students out there, 
who are desperately searching for a note topic, this might not be a bad one 
to take up. 
But there is another way that natural law is relevant to judging which is 
more abstract, but just as important.  To make this point, I would like to 
discuss a speech Pope Benedict XVI gave, not very far from this site, over 
at the United Nations.  Well, the UN is not far as the crow flies, but it’s an 
eternity in cross-town traffic. 
Pope Benedict spoke about the importance of remembering that the 
natural law underlies the U.N.’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights.74  
He explained, “that the rights recognized and expounded in the [Universal] 
Declaration apply to everyone by virtue of the common origin of the 
person.”75  These rights are “inscribed on human hearts and present in 
different cultures and civilizations.”76  The Pontiff was worried about 
efforts “to reinterpret the foundations of the Declaration” and to “fall back 
on a pragmatic approach, limited to determining ‘common ground.’”77
The Pope criticized this approach as wrongly implying that human rights 
are “the exclusive result of legislative enactments or normative decisions” 
made by “those in power.”
 
78  But, more practically, he warned that this 
subjective interpretation of the Universal Declaration could weaken the 
UN’s institutional resolve and moral authority to enforce human rights 
around the globe.79
 
 73. Id. at 2797 (emphasis added).  Similarly, Heller noted that “[t]he debate with respect 
to the right to keep and bear arms, as with other guarantees in the Bill of Rights, was not 
over whether it was desirable (all agreed that it was) but over whether it needed to be 
codified in the Constitution.”  Id. at 2801 (emphasis added). 
  Indeed, if the Universal Declaration is merely a 
statement of the rights which a number of diplomats thought desirable at a 
 74. Pope Benedict XVI, Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly (Apr. 18, 
2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/19/nyregion/18popeatun.html. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. (warning that “[r]emoving human rights from this context would mean 
restricting their range and yielding to a relativistic conception, according to which the 
meaning and interpretation of rights could vary and their universality would be denied in the 
name of different cultural, political, social and even religious outlooks,” and that abandoning 
the natural law conception of the Declaration would weaken the UN’s moral authority to 
enforce human rights, because it would “undermine[] the cogent and inviolable principles 
formulated and consolidated by the United Nations”). 
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particular time, then the UN’s duty and authority to enforce the Declaration 
might properly be called into question. 
The lesson is that ideas matter.  And I believe this lesson applies equally 
to the philosophical underpinnings of our constitutional rights.  The 
judiciary will always be confronted with situations where constitutional 
rights appear inconvenient or even dangerous.  It is our job to protect these 
rights against the passion of the times.  I submit that judges are better 
equipped for this task when they recall that our constitutional rights are 
codifications of those innate rights which exist independent of government.  
Conversely, were we to give in to the view that constitutional rights are 
simply what the founders decided to protect two hundred years ago, I 
believe that the judicial resolve to enforce them would be weakened.  
Indeed, we would be more likely to accept an approach that allows judges 
to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether constitutional rights are really 
worth insisting upon.80
Relatedly, just as the idea that human rights are subjective, and exist only 
because the UN decided they should, could weaken the moral authority of 
the UN, I suggest that applying an analogous view to the Constitution could 
weaken the moral authority of the judiciary.  After all, judges hold neither 
the keys to the Treasury, nor the allegiance of the 101st Airborne Division.  
For that reason, in much of the world, the judiciary is a subservient branch 
of government.  In the United States, judicial decisions are enforced, 
ultimately, because the American people believe that complying with the 
Constitution is a fundamental obligation of government.  I fear that 
adopting the view that the government created constitutional rights, could 
elevate the government above the Constitution, and thereby weaken the 
judiciary’s moral authority. 
 
V 
Returning to the Kagan hearings, after stating that she did not “have a 
view of what are natural rights independent of the Constitution,” now-
Justice Kagan stressed that her “job as a justice will be to enforce and 
defend the Constitution and other laws of the United States”; in that office, 
she would not “act in any way” on the basis of her personal beliefs about 
natural law.81
In closing, I can agree with Justice Kagan to this extent:  to interpret the 
Constitution faithfully, a judge need not believe personally in the natural 
law, and a judge certainly should not invalidate legislation simply because 
it does not comport with the judge’s own views of what the natural law 
requires. 
 
 
 80. Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008) (Scalia, J.) (“The 
very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch 
of Government—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really 
worth insisting upon.”). 
 81. Senate Committee on the Judiciary Holds a Hearing on the Elena Kagan 
Nomination, supra note 1. 
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But, at the same time, a discerning constitutional thinker must appreciate 
the extent to which the constitutional project quintessentially was an effort 
to codify pre-existing natural law rights.  As we saw in Heller, an 
appreciation for the natural law foundations of the Constitution can be 
useful when interpreting a constitutional provision which codified a pre-
existing, natural right.  In such a case, the historical understanding of the 
natural right can clarify ambiguities in the constitutional text, and elucidate 
the rationale and scope of the constitutional right.  And, hopefully, as we 
saw when comparing the Constitution to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, a clear understanding that the Constitution codifies innate, 
pre-existing natural rights, will embolden judges, and citizens, to protect 
and to defend such rights. 
Thank You. 
 
